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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SOPN, PBOR, MOPS, VN, CH, CB, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET COMMENTS ON SINO-VIETNAMESE-KHMER
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SUMMARY: SOVIET PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF CHINESE POLICY
TOWARD VIETNAM, STIMULATED FURTHER BY PEKING'S
ANNOUNCEMENT ON AID TO VIETNAM, REMAINS ON UPSWING,

ECHOING VIETNAMESE CHARGES OF PRC INTERFERENCE IN VIETNAMESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND ALLEGED CHINESE INTENTIONS TO RETARD VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENT. SOVIET MFA VIETNAM DESK OFFICER STATES THAT:

-- CHINESE OVER PAST SIX MONTHS HAVE FRUSTRATED VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE SINO-VIETNAMESE DIFFERENCES, INCLUDING BORDER PROBLEMS;

-- CHINESE ARE CONTINUING SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO KAMPUCHEA AND ARE VIOLATING LAOTIAN AIR SPACE IN THE PROCESS;

-- THE KHMER-VIETNAMESE BORDER CONFLICT IS LIKELY TO LAST "A LONG TIME";

-- VIETNAMESE ARE STILL SUSPICIOUS OF ASEAN, WHICH IS "ANTI-COMMUNIST". HANOI IS WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE IF SOME ASEAN MEMBER-NATIONS WILL MATCH DEEDS WITH THEIR ANNOUNCED DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM;

-- CEAUSESCU'S VISIT TO PEKING AND PYONGYANG AND PNOMH PENH WERE SUCCESSFUL; HIS VISIT TO HANOI AND VIENTIENE WERE FAILURES. END SUMMARY.

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1. PRC SUPPORT FOR THE CHINESE ETHNIC MINORITY IN VIETNAM SPECIFICALLY AND ALLEGED PRC EFFORTS TO BULLY VIETNAM IN GENERAL HAVE DEVELOPED INTO PROMINENT THEMES IN THE ONGOING, VOLUMINOUS ANTI-PEKING PRESS CAMPAIGN IN THE SOVIET PRESS. FOR MOSCOW, THE PRC'S SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM'S CHINESE MINORITY AND THE CUTBACK IN PRC AID TO VIETNAM, AND HANOI'S RESPONSES, CONSTITUTE EXCELLENT PROPAGANDA GRIST FOR SOVIET CHARGES OF CHINESE "HEGEMONISTIC" DESIGNS ON ITS NEIGHBORS AND PEKING'S USE OF CHINESE MINORITIES ABROAD AS A FIFTH COLUMN AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF SMALLER ASIAN COUNTRIES.

2. THE SOVIET PRESS HAS GIVEN DETAILED TREATMENT OF RECENT NHAN DAN AND QUAN DOI NHAN DAN ATTACKS ON CHINESE SUPPORT OF THE CHINESE MINORITY IN VIETNAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH CHARGES THAT PEKING IS DELIBERATELY TRYING TO RETARD VIETNAM'S DEVELOPMENT. JUNE 8 IZVESTIYA CARRIES BRIEF TASS ITEM REPORTING THAT, ON JUNE 6, THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW "WAS RECEIVED AT THE MFA, USSR, WHERE HE PRESENTED THE TEXT OF THE VIETNAMESE MFA ANNOUNCEMENT OF JUNE 5,

1978 RELATING TO RECENT PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS BY THE PRC
IN ITS RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM". MAIN COMMENTARIES
IN JUNE 9 PRAVDA AND JUNE 10 IZVESTIYA CONDEMNED PEKING'S
POLICIES TOWARD VIETNAM. PRAVDA COMMENTARY ACCUSES
CHINA OF ATTEMPTING TO "WHIP UP" (RAZDUT') A NEW CONFLICT
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND CONCLUDES BY ANNOUNCING THAT THE
SRV IS NOT GOING TO FOLLOW SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF ITS
INDEPENDENCE AGAINST "IMPERIALIST ENCROACHMENTS" IN
ORDER "TO WAIVE IT TO PLEASE GREAT POWER CHAUVINISTS
FROM PEKING". HANOI DATELINED TASS ARTICLES PRINTED
IN JUNE 10 AND JUNE 11 PRAVDA EDITIONS DESCRIBE

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PEKING'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON CHINESE AID TO VIETNAM AS

"A NEW HOSTILE ACT" WHICH HAS THE "CLEAR" PURPOSE OF APPLYING "CRUDE PRESSURE" ON VIETNAM. (COMMENT: IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT SOVIET PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF THE PRC HAS BEEN IN THE MAIN BASED ON THE TRENDS IN PUBLIC VIETNAMESE CRITICISM OF PEKING IN THE VIETNAMESE CONFIDENTIAL

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MEDIA. IN PRIVATE, AS EVIDENT BY SOVIET MFA OFFICER'S COMMENTS REPORTED BELOW, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BE EVEN HARSHER IN CRITICIZING THE PRC FOR STANDING BEHIND ALL VIETNAMESE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND FOR FRUSTRATING HANOI'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP INTO A REGIONAL POWER CENTER IN ASIA. AS MENTIONED REF B, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STILL WARY OF GETTING TOO FAR OUT IN FRONT OF THE VIETNAMESE PUBLICLY, GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVOKING VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES THAT MOSCOW IS EXPLOITING OR EVEN AGGRAVATING SINO-VIETNAMESE DIFFERENCES TO IMPROVE ITS POSITION IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. THIS GAP IN THE SOVIET PRIVATE AND PUBLIC POSTURE HAS PROGRESSIVELY NARROWED AS SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS HAVE DETERIORATED IN RECENT WEEKS. IF THE DETERIORATION CONTINUES, IT COULD DISAPPEAR ALTOGETHER. END COMMENT.)

3. IN JUNE 7 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF, SOVIET MFA VIETNAM DESK OFFICER (AND DEPUTY CHIEF MFA SEA DEPT) R. L. KHAMIDOU LIN LAMBASTED THE CHINESE FOR USING BOTH THE CHINESE MINORITY ISSUE IN VIETNAM AND THE NEIGHBORING POL POT REGIME TO RETARD VIETNAM'S DEVELOPMENT INTO A STRONGER REGIONAL POWER. KHAMIDOU LIN ASKED WHY THE CHINESE HAD NOT COMPLAINED WHEN THE POL POT REGIME THREW THE CHINESE OUT OF KAMPUCHEA. HE ACCUSED THE CHINESE OF HARRASSING THE VIETNAMESE ALONG THE SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS. SOME OF THE BORDER INCIDENTS, HE SAID, HAVE ERUPTED INTO FIREFIGHTS. EARLY THIS YEAR, HE SAID, THE CHINESE STAGED ARMY MANEUVERS OPPOSITE VIETNAM'S NORTHEAST BORDER WITH CHINA AND NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. CHINESE TROOPS PERIODICALLY MOVE BOUNDARY PILLARS FURTHER INTO VIETNAMESE TERRITORY CONFIDENTIAL

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(MOSTLY, HE CLAIMED, IN THE CENTER REGION OF THE BORDER BETWEEN THE LANG SON AND LAO KAY AREAS). VIETNAMESE TROOPS THEN REPLACE THE PILLARS, ONLY TO HAVE THEM MOVED AGAIN. KHAMIDOU LIN CONTINUED THAT,

DESPITE PEKING'S NUMEROUS PROVOCATIONS AGAINST VIETNAM, HANOI HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO SEEK BETTER RELATIONS WITH CHINA, DUE TO CHINA'S ENORMOUS SIZE AND PROXIMITY. HANOI HAS SENT PHAN HIEN TO PEKING A NUMBER OF TIMES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SINO-VIETNAMESE DIFFERENCES INCLUDING SINO-VIETNAMESE BORDER PROBLEMS. KHAMIDOU LIN CLAIMED THAT, AS IN THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER NEGOTIATIONS, PEKING'S NEGOTIATORS HAVE FRUSTRATED PROGRESS BY MAKING UNREASONABLE PRE-CONDITIONS AND BY DELIBERATELY INSTIGATING PROCEDURAL DELAYS. PHAN HIEN IS IN PEKING BUT IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE ANY MORE PROGRESS WITH THE CHINESE THAN IN THE PAST.

4. KHAMIDOU LIN DESCRIBED THE POL POT REGIME AS TOTALLY SUBSERVIENT TO THE CHINESE. HE ALLEGED THAT THE CHINESE HAVE BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE THOUSAND MILITARY ADVISERS IN KAMPUCHEA. THE CHINESE ARE SUPPLYING INCREASINGLY MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY TO THE KHMERS, INCLUDING TANKS AND LONG RANGE ARTILLERY. IN AN ALLEGATION MADE IRONIC BY LAST FALL'S SOVIET AIR LIFT TO ETHIOPIA, KHAMIDOU LIN CHARGED THAT THE CHINESE ARE FLYING ARMS TO KAMPUCHEA OVER LAOS WITHOUT BOTHERING TO REQUEST OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION FROM THE LAO GOVERNMENT. THE LAO HAVE ASKED THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO RESPECT LAO SOVEREIGNTY, KHAMIDOU LIN SAID, BUT THE CHINESE CONTINUE THEIR AIRLIFT WITHOUT CONSULTING THE LAOTIANS.

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5. KHMER-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS: KHAMIDOU LIN DESCRIBED THESE AS NON-EXISTENT. THE POL POT REGIME, IN THE PERSON OF IANG SARY, EVEN REFUSED TO ACCEPT SRV PROPOSALS WHICH THE LAO AMBASSADOR IN PNOMH PENH ATTEMPTED TO HAND OVER IN APRIL AND MAY. IN CONTRAST TO HIS DIRE PREDICTIONS ABOUT THE INEVITABLE FATE
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OF ALL KHMER GOVERNMENTS THAT ATTEMPT TO FAN ANTI-VIETNAMESE RESENTMENT MADE LAST NOVEMBER (REF A), KHAMIDOU LIN STATED GLUMLY THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE EXPECTING THE BORDER CONFLICT TO LAST "A LONG TIME". SRV CONCERNS ABOUT THE CHINESE, HE SAID, ARGUE AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE USING THEIR FULL MILITARY POTENTIAL AGAINST THE POL POT REGIME. HANOI CAN ONLY ACCEPT THE INEVITABILITY OF CONTINUED FIGHTING. IN COMMENTING ON KHMER TACTICS, HE REMARKED THAT KHMER FORCES STRIKE HARD AT ONE BORDER AREA WHICH THEY CLAIM, SUCH AS HA TIEN. WHEN THE VIETNAMESE FORCES MOBILIZE AND COUNTER-ATTACK, THE KHMERS WITHDRAW AND BUILDUP FOR A STRIKE IN ANOTHER AREA SUCH AS THE PARROTS BEAK OR THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS. KHAMIDOU LIN SAID OVER 100,000 KHMER REFUGEES ARE NOW IN VIETNAM.

6. SOVIET-SRV RELATIONS: KHAMIDOU LIN PREDICTABLY LAUDED THESE RELATIONS BUT CAREFULLY AVOIDED DISCUSSING SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID PROGRAMS TO EITHER VIETNAM OR LAOS.

7. VIETNAMESE POLICY TOWARD ASEAN: KHAMIDOU LIN, IN RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ON THIS ISSUE, BASICALLY REPEATED THE THEMES PRESENTED BY PHILIPPINES DESK OFFICER BULIGIN IN APRIL (REF B), TO WHICH KHAMIDOU LIN HAS SUBSCRIBED ALSO. HANOI'S VIEW IS THAT ASEAN IS

"ANTI-COMMUNIST". VIETNAM IS THEREFORE "SUSPICIOUS" OF ASEAN'S MOTIVES. HANOI IS READY TO PURSUE BETTER RELATIONS WITH ASEAN'S MEMBERS ON A BILATERAL BASIS. IT IS PLEASED BY SOME PROFESSIONS OF GOOD INTENTIONS TOWARD VIETNAM MADE BY COUNTRIES LIKE THAILAND, MALAYSIA AND THE PHILIPPINES; HOWEVER, THE VIETNAMESE STATED THEY WILL BE CLOSELY WATCHING TO SEE IF THESE
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WORDS ARE TRANSLATED INTO DEEDS. KHAMIDOU LIN INDICATED THAT HANOI IS LESS EXPECTANT OF AN IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA THAN WITH OTHER ASEAN MEMBERS. (COMMENT: AS REPORTED EARLIER, THE SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO MOVE TOWARD "ACCEPTING" ASEAN AS LONG AS THE VIETNAMESE ENTERTAIN SUCH RESERVATIONS, DESPITE POSSIBLE SOVIET CONCERN THAT THE CHINESE, BY LAUDING ASEAN, MAY GAIN AN ADVANTAGE. SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS HERE AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN ASEAN COUNTRIES OCCASIONALLY PUT A MORE POSITIVE GLOSS ON MOSCOW'S PERSPECTIVE TOWARD ASEAN, PARTICULARLY IN CONVERSATIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET POSITION TOWARD ASEAN, HOWEVER, WILL REMAIN LINKED TO VIETNAM'S. END COMMENT.

8. CEAUSESCU VISIT TO SEA: KHAMIDOU LIN DID NOT TRY TO HIDE SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH CEAUSESCU'S VISIT TO THE PRC, NORTH KOREA AND SEA. HE SAID CEAUSESCU'S ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO VISIT ONLY CHINA AND PYONGYANG. KAMPUCHEA WAS THEN ADDED TO HIS ITINERARY. THESE COUNTRIES, KHAMIDOU LIN CLAIMED, ALL HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON WITH THE ROMANIAN "VIEW". HOWEVER, CEAUSESCU "COULD NOT AVOID" PUTTING VIETNAM AND LAOS ON HIS ITINERARY, PARTICULARLY VIETNAM, GIVEN ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE REGION. CEAUSESCU WAS ALSO APPARENTLY HOPING TO MEDIATE THE KHMER-VIETNAMESE BORDER DISPUTE. NOT SURPRISINGLY, KHAMIDOU LIN SAID, CEAUSESCU'S VISITS TO PYONGYANG, PEKING AND PNOMH PENH WERE SUCCESSES; HIS VISITS TO HANOI AND VIENTIENE WERE FAILURES. CEAUSESCU'S MEDIATORY OFFER FAILED BECAUSE THE VIETNAMESE CONSIDER CEAUSESCU BIASED AGAINST VIETNAM IN THEIR DISPUTE WITH KAMPUCHEA. BESIDES, THE VIETNAMESE FEEL THAT VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA SHOULD WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEM ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

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THE VIETNAMESE ARE ALSO WARY OF ROMANIA'S GOOD RELATIONS
WITH CHINA AND DISTURBED BY THE SMALL AMOUNT OF ROMANIAN
ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM, WHICH IS EXCEEDED BY HUNGARY
AND EVEN BULGARIA. HE REMARKED THAT THE THINNESS OF
THE ROMANIAN-VIETNAMESE COMMUNIQUE AND THE LACK OF A
ROMANIAN-LAO COMMUNIQUE IN VIENTIENE ILLUSTRATE THE
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POOR RESULTS OF CEAUSESCU'S VISITS TO HANOI AND
VIENTIENE. (COMMENT: THE SOVIETS WERE UNDOUBTEDLY
SATISFIED AT CEAUSESCU'S FAILURE TO MEDIATE THE KHMER-
VIETNAMESE BORDER CONFLICT, AND PROBABLY ACTIVELY
LOBBIED WITH THE VIETNAMESE AGAINST CEAUSESCU'S
EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD. KHAMIDOU LIN'S PRIVATE
COMMENTS AND THE BARE MINIMUM SOVIET PRESS COVERAGE

OF CEAUSESCU'S SOUTHEAST ASIA TRIP CONSTITUTE CLEAR INDICATIONS OF SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH CEAUSESCU'S TRIP TO SEA, PARTICULARLY TO KAMPUCHEA. ALTHOUGH SOVIET PRESS (INCLUDING PRAVDA MAY 26) PUBLISHED BRIEF, DESCRIPTIVE ARTICLES ON CEAUSESCU'S TALKS IN HANOI, WE HAVE SEEN NO REFERENCE TO HIS KAMPUCHEA VISIT OTHER THAN ONE SENTENCE IN JUNE 2 NOVOYE VREMYA SIMPLY NOTING HIS "OFFICIAL FRIENDLY VISITS TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA". WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY WERE UNHAPPY WITH THE REFERENCES TO "DOMINATIONISM" BOTH IN PNOMH PENH AND PYONGYANG, ALTHOUGH, IN THE OPINION OF SOVIET KOREAN DESK OFFICER FADEYEV, THE KHMERS CONSIDER THE REFERENCE DIRECTED AT VIETNAM AND NOT, LIKE PYONGYANG, DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S., CHINA OR THE SOVIET UNION. END COMMENT. TOON

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